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Abstract 
Between 1906 and 1917 China (under the Imperial and then Republican regimes) enacted a 
highly effective intervention to suppress the production of opium. Evidence from British 
Foreign Office records suggest that the intervention was centred, in many areas, upon a 
highly repressive incarnation of law enforcement in which rural populations had their 
property destroyed, their land confiscated and/or were publically tortured, humiliated and 
executed. Crops were forcefully eradicated and resistance was often brutally suppressed by 
the military. As few farmers received compensation or support for alternative livelihood 
creation the intervention pushed many deeper into poverty. Importantly, the repressive nature 
of the opium ban appears to have been a contributing factor to the fragmentation of China, 
highlighting the counter-productivity of repressive interventions to reduce drug crop 
production.  
 
 Introduction 
 
Between 1906 and 1917 China (under the Imperial and Republican regimes) enacted a highly 
effective intervention to suppress the production and consumption of opium. Historian Mary 
Clabaugh Wright (1968: 14) pronounced the intervention as ‘the largest and most vigorous 
effort to stamp out an established evil’: a quote often reproduced when discussing the 
intervention (see Adshead, 1984; Forge, 1974). This article revisits the national intervention 
by analysing its impact upon opium farming communities.  While the intervention was a 
'comprehensive attack on the whole opium complex from growers to smokers' (Adshead, 
1984: 71), this paper concentrates solely on the attention directed at opium farmers.   
Evidence from British Foreign Office (FO) observers suggest that local interventions were 
centred upon a highly repressive incarnation of law enforcement, in which rural populations 
had their property destroyed, their land confiscated, and/or were publically tortured, 
humiliated and executed. Crops were forcefully eradicated and resistance was often brutally 
suppressed by the military. As few farmers received compensation or support for alternative 
livelihood creation the intervention pushed many deeper into poverty.  
The brutality of the techniques used to enforce the opium ban, identified in this paper, 
remain underemphasized by contemporary accounts. This paper will, therefore, go some way 
to rectifying a blind spot in the literature by analysing new evidence, collected from 
documents archived at the British National Archives, from the perspective of the harm's done 
to opium farming communities.  
It is not the authors' intention to attribute blame, but rather to add some balance to the 
history of drug control in China. This has much contemporary significance. The case study 
provides some insight into the dangers of failing to consider the impact on opium farming 
 communities when suppressing drug crops. Inhumane interventions can be politically 
destabilising which can, in turn, inflate drug crop production.  
The documents used include reports by British FO officials. These reports were often the 
outcome of joint-investigations conducted by both British and Chinese officials. Reports from 
Chinese administered anti-opium societies and English translations of official Chinese 
regulations were also used. The reports of FO officials and anti-opium societies are based 
upon a mixture of direct observations and information gathered from informants. The 
informants included religious missionaries and journalists, themselves well situated for direct 
observation.  
It is accepted that there may be some bias in British FO accounts: all archived documents 
are shaped by the political, moral and ideological context of the time (Scott, 1990). It is also 
possible that British and Chinese observers may have recorded, perceived or evaluated events 
differently from each other. The level of divergence between British and Chinese accounts 
may, however, have been limited by FO observers being joined in their fieldwork by Chinese 
officials and the utilisation of Chinese informants.  
Furthermore, Marc Trachtenberg (2007: 147; see also Tosh, 2010) has suggested that 
closed or restricted government documents (which later become open-archival) that survive 
are ‘far and away the best source there is’. Privacy allows authors to express themselves more 
freely than they would in public. Therefore, closed and restricted documents tend to be more 
reliable and less distorted than published documents, and as such can: 
 
… normally be taken as genuine … Documents, after all, are generated 
for a government’s own internal purposes, and what would be the point of 
keeping records if those records were not meant to be accurate? It’s just 
 hard to believe that a major goal … would be to deceive historians thirty 
years later (Trachtenberg, 2007: 147). 
 
Additionally, a number of influential studies into Chinese opium markets have relied 
primarily (Adshead, 1966, 1984; Newman, 1995; Spence, 1975) or partially (Reins, 1990; 
Wyman, 2000) on archived English language sources. This said, the author sees this paper as 
a first step in investigating the abuses committed in the name of drug control in China. Future 
research might triangulate the findings of this paper with archival Chinese sources, and/or 
evidence generated from other foreign observers. By doing this a more complete picture may 
be established, one which limits the potential distortions inherent in any set of documents 
created and stored by political organisations.  
 
Recent narratives on the 1906-1917 intervention  
 
Following the tradition of Mary Clabaugh Wright (1968: 14), much of the contemporary 
literature on the 1906-17 intervention begins with an elucidation of its drug control success. 
Consider some of the following: 
 
It brought about quick, impressive results that proved the initial scepticism 
of the British and other Western diplomats wrong (Bianco, 2000: 292). 
  
The outcomes of the first years were impressive, and eradication seemed 
highly probable by the time the dynasty collapsed (Paulès, 2008: 233). 
 
 The outcome of the Qing anti-opium plan rapidly became spectacular: a 
very considerable decrease in both opium production and consumption took 
place, and on the eve of the 1912 Revolution, according to even formerly 
highly sceptical Western witnesses, opium was close to complete 
eradication (Paulès, 2008: 235). 
 
Beginning in late 1906, it had by the end of 1908 succeeded in markedly 
curtailing the cultivation and consumption of opium at home and in 
obtaining formal assurance from the British to terminate gradually opium 
imports. These startling achievements are further magnified when we 
consider the setting within which they occurred (Reins, 1991: 101). 
 
In terms of drug, or crime, control the intervention was undoubtedly successful: it is one of 
only a handful of major opium producing states to have successfully removed opium 
production from their national territory. If the intervention were administered today, however, 
there would be significant moral outrage. The effectiveness of the intervention would not - 
nor should not - detract from the widespread harms caused to opium farming communities. 
As such, words such as ‘startling achievement’, ‘spectacular’, ‘impressive’, and even 
‘successful’ should be avoided, or at least followed by a strong caveat on the abusiveness of 
the intervention. An additional reason to avoid too much celebration is that the intervention 
factored in the eventual fragmentation of China, which, in turn, factored in increased opium 
production after 1917. This is not to suggest that the authors cited above, or below, would 
support the abusive treatment of farmers, nor is it an indictment of their scholarly 
contribution. Instead, it is hoped that this analysis of new evidence from an alternative 
 perspective will be taken as a compliment to their work and help inform future research on 
the history of opium in China and drug control more generally.  
While several authors have indicated some level of abuse, none have highlighted the 
extent. Thomas Reins, for example, uses British FO records to indicate how the governor-
general of Yunnan-Kweichow ‘under-took opium suppression with a vengeance’ (Reins, 
1991: 128).  ‘Vengeance’ is, however, left undefined and thus open to individual 
interpretation. Judith Wyman (2000: 221) has indicated how law enforcement in Sichuan 
Province ranged from ‘moral persuasion to heavy fines to corporal punishment’, including on 
the spot strikes with a bamboo cane (‘bambooing’) for unregulated opium den keepers.  
Lucien Bianco (2000: 306; see also Adshead, 1984), suggests that the majority of officials 
felt that immediate forced eradication was ‘too stringent’. This may well have been the case, 
especially as evidence suggests that officials were coerced into mistreating farming 
communities by a combination of rewards and threats of punishment. Accounts described 
below, however, suggest that many officials were willing to put aside their reservations and 
administer interventions which went beyond the forced eradication of crops. Bianco (2000) 
does, however, highlight the economic damage that forced eradication placed upon the farmer 
by describing how several farmers completed suicide or violently confronted eradication 
teams.  
Joyce Madancy (2001: 441) provides an account closer to the nature of the intervention 
described in British FO accounts. Madancy begins by suggesting that after the 1911 
Revolution the intervention ‘became increasingly coercive as opium farmers resisted efforts 
to uproot their crops’. While ‘coercive’ could be interpreted as an intervention centred upon 
law enforcement and does not necessarily equate abuse, a later sentence describes how it 
increasingly ‘became difficult to distinguish genuine popular antipathy toward opium from a 
general tolerance of official policy or fear of state repression’. This is followed by a 
 description of a magistrate who ordered that an entire village be torched for violently 
opposing opium suppression (Madancy, 2001: 458). This account is more intone with the 
evidence presented below. This said, as abuse remains a minor element of the study, 
Madancy’s account falls short of illustrating the widespread nature of the harms caused to 
opium farming communities through physical punishments and economic insecurity.   
Madancy is correct that the intervention became more ‘coercive’ after 1911. Increased 
repression may have had an element of a new regime asserting its authority, or it may have 
been a response to higher-levels of resistance to prohibition in many areas after the 1911 
Revolution (FO, 1913a, 1913b). For example, a British official noted how one year after the 
Revolution Hunan Province undertook ‘the severest repressive measures yet recorded against 
the opium trade’ (Giles, 1913: 3). Nonetheless, as shall be highlighted below, the level of 
abuse had increased from a highly repressive foundation. The following section provides a 
historical context of opium in China. This will be followed by the presentation of evidence of 
the harms caused to opium farming communities collected from archived FO records. The 
paper concludes by reviewing the counter-productiveness of the intervention.   
 
Context 
 
In 1799, an Imperial edict was issued in China prohibiting the importation of opium. The 
British East-India Company (the source of the majority of opium consumed in China) 
responded by cosmetically dissolving responsibility for the trade by forbidding its employees 
from exporting opium. Indian opium, however, continued to be produced and packaged 
specifically for the Chinese market and sold at auction to private merchants who shipped to 
China, where corrupt officials or professional smuggling networks facilitated illicit 
importation (Windle, 2012). While the trade in opium was not placed under international 
 regulation until 1912, and was at the time routine practice engaged in by many Western and 
Asian states, it was a violation of Chinese law (Windle, forthcoming).1  
In 1833, the British colonial government in India increased the area under cultivation and 
removed a 4,000 chest2 cap on exports to China. These changes significantly increased 
exports of Indian opium to China. This reduced prices and increased availability; 
consequently inflating Chinese consumption and the outflow of silver. This, in turn, deflated 
the Chinese economy and increased domestic opposition to the trade. China banned opium 
imports, which subsequently ignited the first ‘Opium War’ (1839-42). The conflict was ended 
by the ratification, in 1842, of the Treaty of Nanking. There was, however, no mention of 
opium in the Treaty, which centred upon opening China to Western commerce and 
diplomacy, including forcing China to cede Hong Kong and compensate for damages done to 
British opium merchants. The Treaty was the first of the so-called 'unequal treaties'; meaning 
that China made nearly all of the concessions, the British made few, and China was forced to 
deal with Western powers on Western terms.3 The illicit trade continued as before; albeit at 
an increased level (Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000; Farley, 1977; Wakeham, 1977; Windle, 
2012). By the 1830s there were an estimated two (Zhou, 1999) to three million (McCoy, 
2003) consumers of opium in China. 
In 1858, the Chinese government - after fighting a Second ‘Opium War’ (1856-60) with 
the British and French – legalised the importation of opium by including it on a list of goods 
subject to import tariff. Much like the Treaty of Nanking, there was no mention of opium in 
the Treaty of Tianjin, ratified in 1860 to end the Second Opium War. The Treaty again 
centred upon opening China to Western powers, including allowing British ships to enter 
                                                 
1 The Chinese prohibition was one of a number of prohibitions enacted in Asia during the 17th, 18th 
and 19th centuries. All of which were later undermined by Western traders (Windle, forthcoming). 
2 One chest contained 63.5kg (Pietschmann et al, 2009). 
3 The Treaty is still seen in China as a prime example of foreign imperialist exploitation (Wakeham, 
1977; Zhou, 1999). 
 Chinese sovereign waters in pursuit of pirates (Spence, 1990). The legalisation of opium 
imports came about through a series of negotiations between China and the major Western 
powers on the import tariffs of various commodities. Under significant pressure, China 
agreed with the American and British proposal of imposing an import tariff on opium 
(Lazich, 2006): thus overturning the long held prohibition on the importation of opium.  
After import legalisation, China approved the taxation of opium production in Yunnan 
Province to fund the suppression of the Panthay Uprising. Several other provinces followed 
this example and de facto legalisation preceded the official repeal of prohibition in the mid-
1880s. After which many provinces encouraged the production of opium and, importantly, 
improved the quality of opium being produced. By 1905 China produced eight times more 
than was imported: Sichuan and South-West Hupei Provinces together produced eight times 
that of India, which remained China’s primary, although not only, foreign opium source 
(Windle, 2011, 2012).4 Almost all opium was consumed within China, although a small 
amount was exported to French Indochina (FO, 1913c). 
Low prices and profuse availability increased consumption to exceptionally high levels. In 
1890, an estimated 10 percent of the Chinese population smoked opium (Spence, 1975); this 
may have been as high as 50 (Adshead, 1984), 60 or 80 percent in some areas (Spence, 
1975), while as low as five percent in others (Newman, 1995). By 1906 official Chinese 
accounts suggest that between 30 to 40 percent of the population had smoked opium (FO, 
1907). This said, the majority appear to have consumed small quantities and avoided heavy or 
habitual use (Dikötter et al., 2004; Newman, 1995).  
While opium provided the state with extensive revenues (Jordan, 1908; Windle, 2012), it 
was increasingly perceived as a barrier to economic and military advancement as well as a 
threat to national health (Baumler, 2000; Walker, 1991). Additionally, external barriers to 
                                                 
4 China also imported opium from Persia and Turkey (Windle, 2012).  
 prohibition were weakened at the beginning of the twentieth-century when British opposition 
to prohibition softened and America began lobbying for stricter global controls (Brook and 
Wakabayashi, 2000; Windle, 2012).  
The British decision to remove its long standing opposition to Chinese prohibition was the 
result of a convergence of moral, economic and political concerns. The economic importance 
of opium to the British administration in India had declined significantly during the late-19th 
century (Windle, 2012). Additionally, there had been a gradual shift in the perception of 
opium in the UK from a relatively harmless drug to be tolerated, towards one of opium as a 
threat to health and, thus, something to be prohibited. Furthermore, moral entrepreneurs, 
many of whom had been working in China as missionaries, had been pressurising the British 
government to support China's prohibition. Similar economic, political and moral pressures 
had moved America to convene the First International Opium Commission in Shanghai in 
1909 (Windle, forthcoming). The Commission was centred largely on a multilateral 
agreement to support China in its prohibition (Pietschmann et al, 2009). 
 
The intervention  
 
In September 1906, China issued an Imperial Decree declaring the gradual suppression of 
opium production, trade, and consumption. This was followed by the ‘Regulations Giving 
Effect to the Imperial Decree’ which obliged provincial governors to: produce estimates of 
the area under cultivation, license and meticulously monitor farmers, annually reduce the area 
and number of farmers by one-ninth, and confiscate land used by unlicensed farmers. 
Rewards for governors which ended production prematurely were also provided for (FO, 
1907). Two months after the enactment of the Regulations governors were ordered to halve 
the area under cultivation within two years (International Anti-Opium Association, 1924). To 
 reduce the economic shock to provincial economies, land and transport taxes were increased 
(FO, 1911a), as were taxes on opium just prior to the enforcement of bans (Adshead, 1984). 
Once the ban was enforced, China negotiated the 1908 ‘Anglo-Chinese Ten-Year 
Suppression Agreement’. The Agreement obliged British administered India to annually 
reduce exports to China by ten percent and China to concurrent reductions in production. 
China agreed to allow British consulates to monitor progress (Dixon, 1922).  
The subsequent ‘Prohibition on Opium’ (reproduced in Leech, 1908) ordered provincial 
governors to have banned and suppressed all production by 1915/16. This was followed by 
the 1911 ‘Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement’ which stipulated that any province proving to a 
Joint British-Chinese Commission of Investigation (henceforth Joint Investigation) that they 
were ‘opium-free’ could prohibit the importation of Indian opium. ‘Opium-free’ was defined 
as any province which ‘effectively suppressed the cultivation … of native opium’ 
(reproduced in FO, 1915a: 1). British FO employees stationed in China were thus tasked with 
observing China’s legal commitment to suppression. Joint Investigation consisted of direct 
observations by Chinese and British officials touring opium producing areas. British officials 
supplemented this with information from the local media, religious missionaries, local anti-
opium groups and other informants.      
As can be expected from a state twice the size of Europe the campaign progressed 
unevenly across and within provinces (Adshead, 1984; FO, 1910a; Hosie, 1909; Wyman, 
2000). While conformity was slower in major producing provinces, by mid-1910 all 
provincial leaders had succumbed to pressure and the ban was stringently enforced (FO, 
1910c; see also Adshead, 1984; Forges, 1973). By 1911 many provinces had already been 
declared ‘opium-free’ by Joint Investigation and national production had declined by 89 
percent: from an estimated 35,353 tonnes (Jordan, 1913) in 1906 to 4,000 tonnes in 1911 
(Pietschmann et al., 2009).  
 The national intervention was, however, obstructed by the removal of the Imperial regime 
in the 1911 Revolution. While there was an initial resurgence during the revolutionary period 
(Central China Post, 1912) production remained below 1906 levels (Jordan, 1913). Then, in 
1912, the new regime ordered all officials to renew suppression efforts (Walker, 1991). Joint 
Investigations resumed (Cheng, 1913; Grey, 1913). British FO accounts suggest that the new 
Republican regime initially surpassed ‘the rigors of the Manchu rulers’ (Dixon, 1922: 2) and 
a:  
 
… general survey of the whole evidence leads to the conclusion that with 
the exceptions of Kweichow [Guizhou]…. the authorities throughout the 
Republic are making strenuous efforts (Jordan, 1913: 13). 
 
By 1913, half of all provinces had been declared ‘opium-free’ by Joint Investigation 
(Eisenlohr, 1934; FO, 1913d). By the end of 1917 China was declared ‘opium-free’ in its 
entirety after a comprehensive investigation by a Joint British-Chinese Commission (Foreign 
Policy Association, 1924). The fragmentation of the state from late-1916 was, however, to 
make prohibition unsustainable (Windle, 2011). 
From 1911, numerous warlords had begun consolidating their authority separate from 
Beijing. In 1915, several warlords from Yunnan Province declared their independence. This 
example was followed by several other provinces.  Then, in June 1916, the Republican 
President, Yuan Shikai, died. Responding to this opportunity, the majority of southern 
warlords declared independence whilst northern warlords fought for authority over the central 
government in Beijing; fragmenting the Chinese state (Spence, 1990; Wakeham, 1977; For 
analysis of post-1916 production see Windle, 2011). 
 While suppression officially continued in areas under Beijing authority – just two or three 
provinces around the capital - control of the central government was unstable and composed 
of belligerent northern warlords (Bianco, 1967). One British consulate reported the futility of 
approaching the impotent central government to protest against increasing production (Dixon, 
1922). Especially as many warlords facilitated opium production to finance conflicts over 
territories, the central government, and/or areas important to the profitable opium trade 
(Bianco, 2000; FO, 1920; International Anti-Opium Association, 1924). While some local 
power-holders coerced farmers into growing opium at the expense of food crops (see Windle, 
2012), in others opium was profitable enough that farmers chose to side with warlords and 
openly resisted bans imposed by civil governments (Bianco, 2000). As will be discussed in 
greater length later in this paper, it is possible that the physical punishments and economic 
insecurity caused by the suppression of opium farming may have factored in the eventual 
removal of the Imperial Regime in 1911, the fragmentation of the state in 1916 and the 
ascension to power of some warlords. As opium production increased during this period of 
instability, the harms caused by the intervention may have been counterproductive to drug 
control objectives in the long-term.  
The remainder of this section shall discuss the methods employed in the 1906-17 
intervention.  The intervention can be split into four broad and overlapping constituent parts: 
disincentives, incentives, punishment of officials, and responses to resistance. 
 
Disincentives 
 
From 1911, the official punishment for opium farming was one to three years imprisonment 
and the confiscation of land (Changsha Jih Pao, 1911; FO, 1913e). Nonetheless, forced 
eradication appears to have been a favoured practice.  Under both the Imperial and 
 Republican regimes farmers were either compelled by the military to eradicate their own 
opium poppies or had their crops destroyed by eradication teams (Hosie, 1912; FO, 1911b, 
1913f, 1913g). For example, in Shantou Prefecture farmers were ordered by the magistrate to 
eradicate their own crops within five days or face military punishment. After which a group 
of soldiers toured the villages forcefully eradicating opium poppies (FO, 1913e, 1915b). 
There are also multiple accounts of the administration of significantly harsher punishments. 
In Yunnan Province, for example, the magistrate issued the following regulation in 1913: 
 
Any person found cultivating the poppy will have his land confiscated: it 
matters not whether the land is his or rented from another. Such person will 
in addition be sentenced to ten years imprisonment without the option of a 
fine. Any person resisting this regulation or refusing to root up the poppy 
when order to do so will be publically shot in accordance with military law 
(FO, 1913m: 2).  
 
In practice, punishments - often enforced by the provincial police and military - for 
cultivation and/or resistance during both Imperial and Republican interventions could include 
a mixture of the following: fines, the seizure or destruction of property, public shaming, 
corporal or capital punishment. One British observer noted how ‘the sacrifice of lives and 
property’ was ‘no obstacle’ (FO, 1913d). There is one description of soldiers beating farmers 
to extract information in Zhejiang Province (FO, 1913h), whilst another British official 
observed:  
 
 … crops were uprooted and trampled on; men were beaten senseless by the 
roadside in the midst of their ruined fields; the job was done with a savage 
thoroughness which defies parallel (Contemporary Review, 1922: 466). 
 
Alexander Hosie, a British consul, remarked of the intervention in Yunnan Province: ‘the 
cultivators were so heavily punished it is unlikely that such offences will recur’ (Hosie, 
1910a: 166). Similarly in 1913, the British consulate in Hunan noted that the intervention 
‘has been accompanied by cruelty and corruption’ (FO, 1913i: 151). Consider the following 
observations: 
 
From 1914 to 1916 poppy cultivators in the country districts [of Jiangxi 
Province] have been harried by officials, gentry and soldiers. Oppressed, 
fined, imprisoned, their land confiscated, and their homesteads burnt, and 
their lives imperilled, opium growers have come to the conclusion that the 
government was in earnest and that the cultivation of the poppy was too 
costly and dangerous an undertaking (FO, 1917a: 283).  
 
Near Shen-chou-fu [Hunan Province] popular feeling was running high in 
consequence of the massacre of an entire family including women and 
children. In a neighbourhood district sixty-seven farmers, who had offered a 
successful resistance to the soldiers, were surrounded in a temple which 
was burned over their heads, and from which none escaped (FO, 1913i: 
151).  
 
 Farmers refusing to eradicate their own crops in a district of Jiangxi Province were ‘in 
some instances shot, in others their houses were burnt and their land confiscated’ (FO, 1917b: 
284). While in Shantou Prefecture, farmers were given five days to uproot all opium poppies. 
After the time frame had elapsed the magistrate toured with 60 soldiers, eradicating all opium 
they came across. In at least one case the soldiers burnt the ‘field watchers’ hut, confiscated 
farmland and eradicated all opium poppies (FO, 1913e). In another case, reported in 1910, an 
entire village was demolished (FO, 1910a; destruction of property was also reported in: FO, 
1913e, 1913g; Turner, 1914).   
A Joint Investigation by British and Chinese officials in Shantung Province observed:  
 
… I saw the Chi Chia Chung poppy grower being dragged through the 
streets handcuffed, a chain around his neck, and on his back a placard 
describing his offence. I was told that he had been sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment and to 4,000 blows from the light bamboo (FO, 1913j; 
canning is also reported in FO, 1909a).  
 
An opium dealer was similarly punished with public humiliation by being placed in a cage 
and paraded around the streets (FO, 1909b). While in: 
 
Changlo [Hupei Province] a man on whose ground two or three plants were 
found was sentenced to death, but at the last moment his sentence was 
moderated, and he was branded and led through the town and adjoining 
districts loaded with chains (FO, 1914a; public humiliation is also reported 
in FO, 1910a).  
 
 In Fujian Province the Joint Investigation described a magistrate who, being a ‘little too 
vigorous’, had arrested and fined farmers, confiscated their land, and burnt their houses. He 
then beheaded any which ‘received these corrections with ill grace’ (Turner, 1914: 3; also 
FO, 1914b).  
There are multiple mentions of opium farmers being executed for refusing to uproot their 
crops or for replanting after the initial eradication (Central China Post, 1912; FO, 1913h; 
Scheltema, 1910; Taylor, 1913). For example, 20 people were executed in Wen-shui-Hsien 
District (Hosie, 1910b), eight were shot in Lo K’ou District (FO, 1917b) and in Hupei 
Province: 
 
… the magistrate recently returned from a trip in his district and brought 
back four prisoners charged with cultivating poppy, and they were all shot 
(FO, 1914c: 1).  
 
In Changsa District, the magistrate ordered that anyone caught sowing opium would be 
‘shot without mercy’ (FO, 1913k: 39). At the extreme, an entire village was massacred as a 
warning to Yunnanese farmers (FO, 1913l) and a ‘few hundred’ farmers were executed in 
Shanxi Province (FO, 1917c: 3). While in Hunan Province, 46 were executed for consuming 
and cultivating opium (Giles, 1913). While the majority of those put to death were shot, there 
are at least two reports of beheadings (FO, 1914b; Turner, 1914). As it was believed that the 
degradation of the body would continue into the next life, beheading represented an 
additional cruelty (Brook et al., 2008).  
Corporal punishment was extended to gentry who permitted – or did not attempt to 
suppress – opium cultivation in their sphere of authority. For example: 
 
 … at Tsingchow the determination of a zealous magistrate who made an 
official tour through his district, flogging local gentry where the poppy was 
found, has had a beneficial effect (FO, 1910a: 2).  
 
While in Guizhou Province a district governor declared that the head men of villages 
growing opium would be punished (FO, 1913f). There are also reports of farmers being 
executed for failing to report neighbours to the authorities (FO, 1917d). 
Even milder punishments provided significant damage. Many opium farmers, or entire 
villages, were fined (FO, 1910c) and then had their fields confiscated. The fields would then 
be sold back to them. As many farmers could not afford to re-buy many became ‘overgrown 
with weeds’ (Turner, 1914: 124). The financial pressure of confiscation must have been 
hugely damaging to resource deficient farmers. For example, in Yu Tu District (Jiangxi 
Province) ‘such heavy fines were inflicted by the former magistrate that the offenders were 
forced to sell their children’ (FO, 1917b: 284).5  
 
Incentives 
 
In 1911, to motivate crop substitution, the Chinese financial commissioner relieved all 
farmers growing cereals of land tax for a year and a half. While this stimulated some 
provinces to experiment with foreign cereals (Chengsha Jih Pao, 1911), no ‘serious attempt’ 
was made to provide alternative incomes. As such, many farmers were pushed deeper into 
poverty and provincial government budgets were depressed (International Anti-Opium 
Association, 1922: 21; FO, 1910b; Rose, 1910). The lack of state support is exemplified by 
                                                 
5 The sale of children to pay off debts created by opium bans has been reported in contemporary 
Afghanistan (Ahmadzai and Kuonqui, 2011; Mansfield, 2004). 
 crop substitution being mentioned just 12 times in the 472 FO reports consulted (although not 
necessarily cited) by this author. One reports how a district in Sichuan Province provided no 
support (FO, 1910b), whilst another recounts how, due to inactivity by the provincial 
government of Yunnan, a British diplomat introduced improved cotton from India (Rose, 
1910). Substitute crops were provided by local governments in four provinces (FO, 1908, 
1913b, 1914a; Rose, 1913; Turner, 1914; Wilkinson, 1910; Wyman, 2000) and some farmers 
were compensated in Yunnan. The viceroy of Sichuan experimented with imported American 
cereals and taught farmers improved agricultural methods (FO, 1909a), although there was no 
substantial provision for developing alternative crops (Adshead, 1984). 
One British official noted how the lack of alternative incomes and increasing 
impoverishment made prohibition unpopular with the majority of Chinese farmers. Whilst the 
outflow of silver to pay for illicitly imported opium made it unpopular with officials. This 
was especially pertinent for provinces such as Yunnan which possessed few exportable 
commodities (Rose, 1910; see Adshead, 1984). The official insightfully concluded that at:  
 
… the first sign of relaxation in ….[the] attitude towards the opium 
question would assuredly be the signal for the poppy to spring up 
throughout the miles of territory now lying fallow for want of capital and 
knowledge and suitable crops (Rose, 1910: 34).  
 
It is likely that the severity of punishments discussed above differed between and within 
provinces. It is also possible that less abusive, and therefore more mundane, opium bans went 
unrecorded by British observers. This said, the imposition of opium bans without the 
provision of alternative sources of income was in itself extremely harmful, regardless of the 
infliction of physical punishments (for contemporary examples of harms caused by banning 
 opium without the provision of alternative incomes see Mansfield and Pain, 2006; Youngers 
and Walsh, 2010). 
 
Punishment of officials 
 
The ‘Regulations Giving Effect to the Imperial Decree’ provided rewards for governors 
which ended production prematurely. In addition to rewards, in many provinces, officials 
were punished for failure to suppress the production of opium (FO, 1910c). For example, 
while officials in eastern Sichuan expressed a degree of apathy for prohibition, the perception 
that efficient suppression would assist their career advancement meant that many undertook 
their orders in a zealous manner (FO, 1910b; also FO, 1913e, 1915c; Spence, 1990). In Anhui 
Province the governor dismissed a district magistrate for failing to reduce opium cultivation 
quickly enough, while other officials had their pay withheld (FO, 1910c, 1913e). Hence, fear 
of failure instilled a motivation to thoroughly enforce prohibition. While production bans 
were intended to be gradually introduced, the linkage of prohibition to career advancement 
quickened the pace of bans. This may, in turn, have influenced decisions to use repressive 
measures. 
 
Violent resistance 
 
British FO records provide several instances of violent resistance to eradication, before and 
after the 1911 Revolution. State responses to violent opposition resulted in significant loss of 
life and perpetuated the abuse of farmers (see FO, 1911b, 1912, 1913a, 1913b, 1913k, 1915b; 
Hosie, 1910a). For example, a Joint Investigation in Hunan Province reported: 
 
 The [provincial] authorities themselves claimed that 200 farmers had lost 
their lives in the Chien-chou prefecture alone in the attempt to defend their 
crops from destruction, and we had independent news of skirmishes and 
loss of life in almost every district along the Kweichow [Guizhou] border 
(FO, 1913i: 151). 
 
In Sichuan Province, the leader of a ‘secret society’ established to protect farmers was 
beheaded after a battle with a battalion of soldiers (FO, 1910b) while, in a separate incident, 
118 farmers were killed by soldiers suppressing a riot (Adshead, 1984). In Shanxi Province, 
20 farmers were killed and 30 were wounded by belligerent soldiers (Hosie, 1910b). In a 
district of Shantou Prefecture the magistrate ordered the arrest of a landlord for facilitating 
opium cultivation. When the soldiers sent to arrest him were attacked by villagers, the 
magistrate returned with a ‘machine gun battalion’ and 280 soldiers: fifty farmers and 
soldiers died in the subsequent conflict (FO, 1913e). In another example, the army executed 
18 members of an ‘opium farmer’s union’ before eradicating the village’s opium poppies 
(FO, 1913l: 36). 
 
The counter-productivity of repressive interventions  
This case study is an extreme example that highlights an important point of contemporary 
interest: Drug crop suppression interventions which present significant harm to farming 
communities are likely to be ineffective in the long-term (and often contrary to current 
international human rights norms, for contemporary examples see Barrett and Nowak, 2009). 
The majority of states which have successfully suppressed or significantly reduced the 
production of opium in their territory have done so by extending the state into formerly 
geographically and socially isolated territories (i.e. Thailand, Laos, Viet Nam). As this state 
 extension can be hindered by policies which further alienate and anger opium farming 
communities, harmful interventions can be counter-productive. Even relatively repressive 
interventions, such as those imposed in China during the 1950s, presented farming 
communities with some incentive to comply: The intervention came about after the removal 
of an unpopular regime in a revolution which professed to place rural communities at the 
centre of agricultural and social reform (Windle, 2011).   
The case of Imperial/Republican China is illustrative for its inability to sustain suppression. 
The intervention was, at least in the localities described above, repressive and failed to 
provide farmers with sufficient alternatives to opium. There is some evidence to suggest that 
the intervention weakened the Imperial regimes’ authority in (ex-)opium producing areas. A 
similar resentment may have been felt for the Republican regime. For example, according to 
Samuel Adshead (1966: 92; 1984), opium suppression in Sichuan Province resulted in 
negative 'structural alterations of the first magnitude' which undermined the provincial 
government, both economically and politically. One of the unintended consequences of the 
intervention being that farmer's discontent with their treatment was a factor in the significant 
number of rural peoples lending their support for the 1911 Republican revolution (Adshead, 
1966, 1984). It is likely that when the state fragmented in 1917 many disgruntled farmers 
provided their support to warlords, and other local power holders, promising the repeal of 
prohibition. This parallels experiences in contemporary Afghanistan.   
In 2000 the Taliban, as rulers of Afghanistan, enforced an opium ban which reduced the 
area under cultivation by 91 percent (UNDCP, 2001). Sources have suggested that the 
intervention was 'inhumane and draconian' with local community leaders ordered to 
forcefully eradicate crops and punish farmers. Many community leaders unable or unwilling 
to suppress the crop were themselves punished. Recorded punishments included public 
humiliation, imprisonment, flogging and execution (Farrell and Thorne, 2005; Moore, 2002). 
 Furthermore, the general brutality of the Taliban regime was sufficient for farmers to accept 
orders and cease opium cultivation, knowing that 'severe punishment, including the 
destruction of property, torture and death, would await any transgressor' (McDonald, 2005: 
94). 
As importantly the economic impact of the ban forced many farmers and landowners to 
borrow money to repay debts incurred during the previous growing season. Others fled to 
Pakistan to avoid repaying debts or sold livestock, or in some cases children (Mansfield, 
2004).  
Furthermore, in several areas, the ban facilitated widespread popular resistance and 
weakened the Taliban’s authority just prior to the American led invasion. Southern Pashtuns, 
for example, fought against the Taliban during the conflict, motivated ‘in large part’ by the 
ban (Felbab-Brown, 2010: 132).6  
Increased production was the second unintended consequence. After the ban ended 
production increased dramatically. This was partly due to farmers being forced to grow 
greater amounts of opium to repay debts (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Mansfield, 2004; UNDCP, 
2001). This is not to suggest that the mistreatment of opium farmers was the primary cause of 
the removal of the Imperial regime in China or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Rather it is 
suggested that repressive treatment and the failure to offer incentive to cease production can 
weaken a state's political capital (Felbab-Brown, 2010).7 This can, in turn, negatively impact 
state authority: the foundation of a long-term, successful, intervention. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
6 The Taliban are believed to have been aware of the threat of revolt created by the resentment 
towards the ban and rescinded it just prior to the invasion (Felbab-Brown, 2010; McDonald, 2005). 
7 Thoumi (2005) discusses how insufficient social capital was a major factor influencing Columbia’s 
‘competitive advantage’ in coca/opium trafficking. 
  
How does one account for such a rapid and effective campaign in a 
province [Sichuan] where the vast majority of the people had a strong 
vested interest in keeping the drug in circulation? (Wyman, 2000: 212). 
 
For Judith Wyman (2000: 213; see also Adshead, 1984; Taylor, 1913), the answer lies in 
the ‘assertive leadership of the provincial government’. While suppression would not have 
been possible without the support of the provincial political elite, the statement overlooks an 
important causal factor: the abuse perpetrated on opium farming communities. Therefore, a 
more nuanced explanation may read: the assertive and highly repressive leadership of the 
provincial government.   
In terms of drug control, the intervention was highly effective. This paper has revisited the 
intervention by focussing on the harms caused to opium farming communities. Evidence 
collected from the British FO suggest that opium poppies were forcefully eradicated whilst 
farmers were fined, had their land confiscation, property destroyed and were subjected to 
public humiliation, corporal and capital punishment. Resistance was often brutally put down 
by the military and many farmers were driven deeper into poverty by the lack of support for 
alternative livelihood creation. The intervention, in short, caused significant harm to opium 
farming communities. If this intervention were undertaken today it would be considered, at 
best, a gross violation of human rights. Additionally, as repression and economic neglect of 
farming communities were contributing factor to the fragmentation of the state, and increased 
production thereafter, suppression was counterproductive in the long-term, if effective in the 
short-term.  
This initial foray into the issue suggests widespread abuses across several parts of China. 
The challenge is now to identify the national extent of abuse. Future research should also 
 identify whether these localised examples are the exception or the rule and, whether they 
were the product of a deliberate and conscious central government policy which resulted in 
widespread and systematic abuse.  
By providing new evidence and refocusing analytical attention from drug control towards 
the harms caused to farmers this paper has gone some way to adding balance to an important 
episode in the history of China and international drug control. This paper not only highlights 
abuses in the name of drug control but also presents an important example of how repressive 
drug crop suppression interventions can be counter-productive in terms of drug policy. The 
case study suggests that policy makers should pay attention to the potential harms imposed 
upon farming communities before creating or implementing policies, whilst academic 
analysis must account for the impacts of interventions on farming communities.  
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